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STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION*
PAUL R. HAYs**

"The Labor Management Relations Act," said Mr. Justice Jackson,
speaking for the Court in Garner v. Teamsters Union,' "... leaves much
to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much." 2
And in Machinists Ass'n v. Gonzales,3 Mr. Justice Frankfurter said for

the Court:
The statutory implications concerning what has been taken
from the States and what has been left to them are of a Delphic
nature, to be translated into concreteness by the process of
litigating elucidation. 4
Congress has continued to refrain. The Garner case itself and the
decisions of the Supreme Court both before and after Garner,while they
have done much to elucidate theory, have also produced in a number of
instances answers of a Delphic nature which raised more questions than
they settled.
We know that state courts do not have the power to enjoin activities
which are protected by the National Labor Relations Act. We know
that they have no power to enjoin activities which that act defines as
unfair labor practices. Garnertold us in addition, and this was perhaps
its most basic proposition, that, since Congress "confided primary inter-

*The material contained in this Article was originally presented by the author
as a part of the American Bar Association regional meeting program in St. Louis
in June 1958.
**Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University; A.B., Columbia University, 1925,
A.M., 1927, LL.B., 1933.
1. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
2. Id. at 488.
3. 356 U.S. 617 (1958).

4. Id. at 619.
(373)
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pretation and application ' 5 of the act to the National Labor Relations
Board, it is that Board, and not the courts, which is to decide whether
an activity is protected or prohibited.
The scheme thus presented in fairly simple, at least in theory and
logic. Labor activities fall into three categories under the act. They
are either protected or prohibited or neither. And the Board is supposed
to decide into which of these categories any particular activity falls.
But in the Garner case itself the Court promptly shattered its own
logical structure. There are, it said, some "instances of injurious conduct
which the National Labor Relations Board is without express power
to prevent and which therefore either [are] 'governable by the state
or [are] entirely ungoverned,'"6 and it cited for the proposition its
decision in the Briggs-Stratton7 case, in which it had in fact been held
that a state court was empowered tq decide in which of the three categories a particular activity was properly classified, and, finding that it
was neither protected nor prohibited, to enjoin it.
The logical difficulty presented by Garner was compounded by the
opinion in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch.8 For in the Weber case, not only
did the Court state, incorrectly, that the holding of the Garner case was
that a state may not enjoin "conduct which has been made an 'unfair
labor practice' under the federal statutes,"9 but it went on to say:
(1) that the ground of the Briggs-Stratton case was that
such conduct [as appeared in that case] was neither prohibited
nor protected by the Taft-Hartley Act and was thus open to state
control";10
(2) that "we would have a different case" if the Board,
instead of ruling that there was no violation of the section
charged, had ruled that no unfair labor practice had been committed, although even in such a case "it would not necessarily
follow that the State was free to issue its injunction"; 1 and
(3) that "[w]e realize that it is not easy for a state court
to decide, merely on the basis of a complaint and answer, whether
the subject matter is the concern exclusively of the federal

5. 346 U.S. at 490.
6. Id. at 488.
7. Local 232, UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949).
8. 348 U.S. 468 (1955).

9. Id. at 475.
10. Id. at 477.
11. Id. at 478.
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Board and withdrawn from the State. This is particularly true
in a case like this where the rulings of the Board are not wholly
consistent on the meaning of the sections outlawing 'unfair
labor practices', and where the area of free 'concerted activities'
has not been clearly bounded. But where the moving party itself
alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring
the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices,
and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act,
may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection
afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in
deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for deter2
mining such issues in the first instance."'
All of this is extraordinarily confusing, and seems to say, in spite
of the clear words of Garner,that every state court has to set itself up as a
National Labor Relations Board and decide whether any activity before
it is protected, prohibited or neither. (In fact its task would be more
difficult than that of the Board, because the Board, having decided that
an activity was not protected, would not ordinarily have to decide
whether it was prohibited, and having decided that an activity was not
prohibited, it would not ordinarily have to decide whether it was
protected.) Even the flexibility provided by the word "reasonably"
seems designed only to assist in determinations which have to be made
on the pleadings, and to provide guidance where the court must decide
on the basis of plaintiffs' allegations, and it might be concluded that
where the court has before it all the evidence which the Board might
have, it must proceed as the Board does to determine the applicability
of the act.
In spite of the inconsistency in Garner,and in spite of the confusing
language of Weber, it seems to me that it simply cannot be true that
every court in the land has received a commission to operate as a National Labor Relations Board. In the first place, the mere statement of
the proposition demonstrates that it is unworkable, even unthinkable.
In the second place, the holding of Garner, regardless of what Weber
says it held, was that the courts, including the Supreme Court itself,
were not to decide whether or not the conduct in question constituted
an unfair labor practice. ("It is not necessary or appropriate for us to
surmise how the National Labor Relations Board might have decided

12. Id. at 481
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this controversy had petitioners presented it to that body. The power
and duty of primary decision lies with the Board, not with us.")1 3 And
in the third place the course of decision since Garner and Weber gives
no support for the proposition.
How then is the Garner decision to be applied in the state courts?
I take Garnerto mean, in effect, that unless there is no possibility at all
that the activity which the state court has before it could be considered,
on the basis of all the evidence which might be presented, to be either
prohibited or protected, the state court cannot act. Since I cannot think
of any situation which involves a labor activity where this would be
the case, I take it that the whole field is preempted, with certain exceptions, such as violence, which are based on other considerations. My
sweeping statement would, of course, include the kind of injurious
conduct involved in Briggs-Stratton,--recurrent work stoppages. I take
it that that very conduct would not be preempted because Garner says
it would not. But under the logic of Garner, it, too, would be preempted,
and I do not believe that any attempt to extend Briggs-Stratton beyond
its exact facts would be successful. And this warning would apply even
to conduct which has been held by the Board, much more clearly than
had the conduct involved in Briggs-Stratton,to be unprotected, though
not prohibited. If, for example, a situation should arise, as in NLRB v.
Electrical Workers,14 in which a state court was asked to enjoin pickets
who were distributing handbills saying "Is East St. Louis (or Cairo) a
Second-Class City?", that court had better not rely on the theory that
this conduct has been held by the Board and by the Supreme Court to
be unprotected.
It is not surprising, however, that some state courts have accepted
the proposition that they have the power to decide for themselves
whether or not an activity is in the protected-prohibited category, and
have thus set themselves up, rather unsuccessfully in most instances,
as National Labor Relations Boards. An outstanding example was the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Goodwins Inc. v. Hagedorn,'1 which was decided before Garner, but which has not been re-

13.
14.
15.

346 U.S. at 489.
346 U.S. 464 (1953).
303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951).
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versed and, indeed, has been followed in recent cases by some of the
lower courts.
One such case, for example, granted an injunction against peaceful
picketing of an employer's office to induce him to return his factory to
New York, holding that neither the picketing nor the copduct at which
it was directed, was an unfair labor practice, that the unlawfulness of
the objective took the situation out of the Garner rule and, indeed, out
of the field of labor relations, and that the activity was precisely that
kind of injurious conduct to which the court referred in Garner as
ungovernable, unless governed by the states.' 6 Other courts have held
that recognition picketing by a minority union may be enjoined, because
it is neither protected, nor prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act,17 that inducing employees not to handle is not prohibited by the
act, unless there is picketing,' 8 that a secondary boycott is not "cognizable" under section 8(b) (4) (A) of the act,' 9 that picketing by a dissident
minority is not an unfair labor practice, because the act sets forth only
unfair labor practices of employers and unions, 20 and that an employer
who brings himself within the Goodwins rule by petitioning the Board
for an election is entitled to an injunction against picketing pending the
21
Board's decision.
Even when the lower courts of New York have denied injunctions,
they have sometimes done so after making NLRB determinations. For
example, one judge found that picketing to induce an employer to hire
more musicians was an unfair labor practice, because any "distinction
between services not performed or not to be performed, and services
not needed is specious." 22 And in another case, the National Labor

16. Freydburg, Inc. v. International Ladies Garment Workers, 128 N.Y.S.2d
470 (Sup. Ct. 1954). See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Brewery Workers, 35 L.R.R.M.
2740 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955), affd, 285 App. Div. 1134, 141 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1st Dept 1955).
17. Baylis v. Quinnonez, 286 App. Div. 1030, 145 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1955);
Colonial Super Markets v. Liss, 7 Misc. 2d 746, 168 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Trading Port, Inc. v. Robilotto, 8 Misc. 2d 343, 168 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See
also Armstrong Daily, Inc. v. New York Mailers' Union, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 71535
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
18. Maplewood Farms, Inc. v. Beck, 6 Misc. 2d 905, 164 N.Y.S.2d 50 (Sup. Ct.
1957).
19. Willoughby Camera Stores, Inc. v. District 15, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists,
AFL, 205 Misc. 455, 129 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
20. Parodi Cigar Co. v. Gaeta, 156 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
21. Licht v. Lasky, 34 L.R.R.M. 2635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954).
22. General Teleradio, Inc. v. Manuti, 205 Misc. 655, 658, 129 N.Y.S.2d 757, 759
(Sup. Ct. 1954).
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Relations Board was said to have exclusive jurisdiction because the
activity alleged was not unlawful. 23 Another judge refused to grant an
injunction on the ground that the evidence was conflicting as to whether
the objective of the picketing was lawful or unlawful, and advised the
24
parties to apply to a federal court for determination of that issue.
On the other hand, at least one of the intermediate appellate courts
has shown a good understanding of Garner, and, in reversing a decision
granting an injunction, has pointed out that it is the duty of the National
Labor Relations Board, rather than of the state courts, to decide whether
25
an activity is or is not an unfair labor practice.
Courts in several other jurisdictions have suffered similar difficulties
in dealing with these protected-prohibited categories as if they were
National Labor Relations Boards. 28 Recognition picketing, where there
is an incumbent union with a contract, has been held not to be an unfair
labor practice.2 7 One court held that this is one of the situations which

Garner says is left to the states. Recognition picketing by a minority
union against an uncertified incumbent has been held to be neither
protected nor prohibited. 28 The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that
picketing for recognition when another union has been certified, is
enjoinable in the state courts, because the employer is not entitled to
protection under the National Labor Relations Act.29 The Wisconsin

supreme court held that picketing of a product was not an unfair labor
practice, and found Garner contradictory on whether or not it was
protected. 30 It rejected the idea that the activity was protected by section
7. Similar difficulties were encountered by the Supreme Court of Idaho,

23. Tensolite Insulated Wire Co. v. Local 1783, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 34
CCH Lab. Cas. ff 71379 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).

24. Monitor Knitwear Corp. v. Nelson, 35 L.R.R.M. 2756 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955).
25. Pleasant Valley Packing Co. v. Talarico, 5 App. Div. 2d 943, 172 N.Y.S.2d
268 (3d Dep't 1958).

26. E.g., Breidert Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers, AFL, 139 Cal. App. 2d 633, 294
P.2d 93 (1956); Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers Union, 301 P.2d 631 (Cal.
App. 1956); Groom v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 34 L.R.R.M. 2440 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1954).

27. Standard Oil Co. v. Oil Workers, AFL-CIO, 40 L.R.R.M. 2445 (Ohio C.P.
1957); M. & M. Wood Working Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 35 L.R.R.M. 2053
(Ore. Cir. Ct. 1954).
28.

Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers Union, 301 P.2d 631 (Cal. App.

1956).
29. Ellis v. Parks, 212 Ga. 540, 93 S.E.2d 708 (1956).
30. Milwaukee Boston Store Co. v. American Fed'n of Hosiery Workers, 269
Wis. 338, 69 N.W.2d 762 (1955).
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two of whose decisions were reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.3 1 And a decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio affirming, four
months after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
32
Fairlawn
case, a lower court injunction against a union's picketing for
recognition after it had been defeated in a Board election was reversed
33
per curiam, the Court citing Fairlawn,Weber and Garner.
On the other
hand, the Kansas supreme court held in 1955 that peaceful recognition
picketing by a minority union was a violation of section 8(b) (1), thus
34
anticipating the Board by some two years.
The appellate courts of several states have attempted to explain at
considerable length the principles applicable to preemption, no doubt
for the guidance of the lower courts. 3 5 In Hyde Park Dairiesv. Teamsters
Union,3 6 the Supreme Court of Kansas presented an especially useful
exposition, though it found difficulty with the inconsistencies in Garner
to which reference has been made above.
Other high courts, like the Supreme Court of Virginia in the
Dougherty37 case, have, in deciding preemption cases, given little useful
guidance to the lower courts. The lower courts of Ohio might even find
a suggestion of rebellion in the language used by the supreme court of
38
that state in a recent case:
Despite the temptation to do so, it is not necessary to discuss
several questions presented by this record, such as... whether
the so-called 'no-man's land' recognized by the Supreme Court
of the United States [in Guss, etc.] requires the judiciary of
Ohio to abdicate its responsibility to secure to each citizen the
constitutionally guaranteed right to a 'remedy by due course of
law' for injury done him.3 9

31. Pocatello Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Elle Constr. Co., 352 U.S. 884
(1956); Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Newberry Co., 352 U.S. 987 (1957).
32. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
33. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cavett Co., 355 U.S. 39 (1957).
34. Kaw Paving Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 178 Kan. 467,
290 P.2d 110 (1955).
35. E.g., Asphalt Paving, Inc., v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 181 Kan. 775,
317 P.2d 349 (1957); Binder v. Construction and Gen. Laborers Union, 181 Kan.
799, 317 P.2d 371 (1957); Friesen v. General Team and Truck Drivers Union, 181
Kan. 769, 317 P.2d 366 (1957); Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., v. Teamsters
Union, 267 Wis. 356, 66 N.W.2d 318 (1954).
36. 182 Kan. 440, 321 P.2d 564 (1958).
37. Dougherty v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 515, 100 S.E.2d 754 (1957).
38. Faxon Hills Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 151 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio
1958).
39. Id. at 13.
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A misunderstanding of the significance of the Vogt case 40 has led
in a few cases to state court action in disregard of the preemption
doctrine. The decision in Vogt concerned only the limitations on picketing
of the fourteenth amendment. It held that the free speech doctrine did
not prevent a state's enjoining coercive recognition picketing. The case
had nothing to do with preemption and both the Supreme Court and
the lower court seem to have assumed that Vogt's businesses did not
affect interstate commerce. 41 But as able a court as the New York
appellate division, first department, was misled by the Supreme Court's
failure to state that preemption was not involved, into affirming the
granting of an injunction against rival picketing of an incumbent con42
tracting union, on the ground that, as the court said in its opinion:
There can no longer be any doubt about the power of a
state court to enjoin picketing under circumstances where its
legislature or courts have adopted a public policy directed against
picketing for unlawful objectives. The decision in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695, A.F.L. v. Vogt, 354 U. S.
284, 77 Sup. Ct. 1166, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1347, makes this indisputably
clear. In effectuating its own public policy, the courts do not
intrench upon the preempted field of labor relations provided for
43
in the Taft-Hartley Act.
Some of the lower New York courts have hastened, of course, to
follow along this happy path. 44 The Texas court of civil appeals has
fallen into the same error, 45 as perhaps has the highest court of Con46
necticut.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has upheld, against a claim of preemption, the applicability of its statute prohibiting stranger picketing
on the ground that "the Taft-Hartley Act . .. is concerned with and
limited to the relations between employers and employees."47 Although
the court does not develop the argument, it might run as follows:
40. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
41. See Vogt v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL, 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W.2d
749 (1956).
42. Metzger v. Fay, 4 App. Div. 2d 436, 166 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dep't 1957).
43. Id. at 439, 166 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
44. E.g., General Iron Corp. v. Livingston, 171 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Planet Wood Corp. v. Marine Workers, 42 L.R.R.M. 2160 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).

45. Office 'Employees Union, AFL-CIO v. Houston Lighting and Power Co.,
314 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
46. Devine Bros. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 145 Conn. 77, 139 A.2d 60
(1958). See also Marnet, Federal Preemption, Free Speech and Right to Work
Statutes, 32 NW. U.L. REv. 143, 171-72 (1957).
47. Dougherty v. Commonwealth, supra note 37, at 379, 100 S.E.2d at 760.
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Since the defendants in the case were individuals, and not labor
organizations, their picketing activity was not prohibited by the act.
Since they were not employees, they were not "protected" by section
in
the sense that it would be an unfair labor practice to discharge or
8
otherwise discriminate against them with regard to the terms or tenure
of employment.
Since the state, and not the employer, brought the action against
them, it is hard to see that the employer had committed any unfair labor
practice.
Therefore, since the activity is neither prohibited by the Act, nor
protected by it, there is no preemption.
Leaving aside the position that the term "employee," as the Board
says, "includes 'any member of the working class,' ,4 the fallacy, of
course, lies in overlooking the general protections afforded by section 7.
Garner itself involved stranger picketing, and the court suggested that,
if the activity was not prohibited, it might well be protected. It is true
that Garner involved a labor organization rather than individuals, but
that cannot be the basis of any sound distinction. The Texas court of
civil appeals has advanced a similar reason for denying a claim of preemption in a case in which an injunction was sought against a labor
organization.

49

At least one lower Wisconsin court appears never to have heard of
the Guss5 ° case, since it held, nine months after Guss, that the state could
act in a situation where the employer's business did not meet NLRB
jurisdictional standards. 51
Because so few lower court cases are reported, it is impossible to
say how many injunctions are being granted in the lower courts in
cases in which there should be preemption under the correct application
of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. Judging, however,
by the large proportion of such decisions in the cases which are reported,
and by the proportion of the cases on appeal in which injunctions were
48. Texas Natural Gasoline Corp., 116 N.L.R3. 405, 406 (1956).
49. Office Employees Union, AFL-CIO v. Houston Lighting and Power Co.,
314 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
50. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
51. Sheet Metal Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.,
34 CCH Lab. Cas. f 71305 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1957).
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granted by the lower courts, it would appear that in actuality we have
not yet felt in the regulation of labor relations the full impact of the preemption doctrine.
The circuit court of Ottawa County, Michigan, having refused before
Guss to believe that the Supreme Court of the United States would
adopt the Guss doctrine, 52 continues to enjoin, holding that the Guss
case is unconstitutional as depriving parties of due process.53 The judge
states that "nature abhores a vacuum"' ' 4 and cites the dictionary definition of "anarchy"' 5 5 as describing the present situation. Ottawa County
may be unique in its attitude, but, adding up the effects of ignorance
and misunderstanding of the preemption doctrine, and what in some
cases seems to be a deliberate determination to grant injunctions in
spite of it, there is still, in practice, a large body of labor activity which
is subjected to state power.
I now turn from the problem of the failure to recognize preemption
where it is properly applicable, to the question of exceptions from the
preemption rule.
First let us consider the possibilities inherent in the old controversy
over the term "labor dispute." Although the judge who thought that the
ILG, by picketing against a runaway shop, had removed itself from the
field of labor relations, was surely wrong, there must in fact be boundaries
to that field. The reach of preemption may be very wide, but it cannot
include anything and everything which one of the parties may choose
to call a labor activity. The Norris-La Guardia Act 5 6 was enormously
effective in widening the limits of what was to be classified as a labor
dispute, but the Supreme Court, with the chief author of that act writing
for the Court, held that a dispute between a labor union and a store over
hours of delivery, payment of a bill and sale of non-union goods, was
not, in the circumstances of that case, a labor dispute within the meaning
of the act. 57 (I have not done justice to the Wagshal case in this brief
statement, and its exact significance is certainly arguable; but I firmly

52. School Dist. v. Grand Rapids Bldg. Trades Council, 37 L.R.R.M. 2232 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1955).
53. Johnson v. Grand Rapids Bldg. Trades Council, AFL-CIO, 33 CCH Lab.
Cas. 70996 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1957).
54. Id. at 95035.
55. Ibid.
56. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952).
57. Bakery Drivers Union v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol23/iss4/1
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believe that it can properly stand for the point which I wish to make.)
Even giving the term labor activity the broadest possible meaning in
order to avoid the crippling limitations imposed by the old injunction
cases, there still must be some kinds of activity in which labor unions
or employees engage which does not come within that meaning. For
example, in some recent cases in New York, employers seeking an injunction have alleged that the organization conducting picketing activities
under the name of a labor union was not in fact a labor union at all, and
that it was not seeking bargaining rights or even membership, but that
it was a racketeering group which was picketing merely for the purpose
of being bought off. Other applications have alleged that pickets claiming
to represent a labor organization were in fact hired by business competitors for the purpose of disrupting the business of the picketed firms.
When we get into the field of purpose, rather than parties, the questions
become more difficult. But not long ago pickets were placed by a union
president in front of a business which was owned by the union president's
brother-in-law. There was no discoverable reason for the picketing,
except to secure a competitive advantage for the brother-in-law's firm.
I have always had some doubt about the case of Hunt v. Crumboch58
where the Supreme Court held the Sherman-Clayton Act exception for
labor activity"9 applicable to a boycott which was being conducted
because of a personal vendetta between the employer and a union leader.
This field, as providing exceptions to preemption, may well be confined to pretty extreme situations, but it is still worth keeping in mind.
Some limited exceptions may be found with relation to the parties
involved in labor activities, even where one of them is a genuine labor
union. For example, the independent contractor exemption may have
possibilities, although the New York court was probably wrong when it
denied a claim of preemption where a union was engaged in product
picketing for the purpose of organizing the distributors who, the court
found, were independent contractors rather than employees. 60
The Tennessee supreme court was almost certainly right in exercising

58. 325 U.S. 821 (1945).
59. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
60. Arnold Bakers v. Strauss, 1 App. Div. 2d 604, 153 N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't

1956).
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state power with respect to the activities of employees of a municipally
owned electric company."1
On the other hand, although the Board and the court of appeals for
the third circuit have held that a political subdivision of a state (a
county) is a "person" within the meaning of the boycott provisions of
the act, 62 the Wisconsin supreme court has held the contrary and has
denied a claim of preemption.6 3 A Maryland circuit court has correctly
upheld a claim of preemption on the ground that a railroad is a "person"
within the meaning of section 8 (b) (4) (A) ,64 citing Local v. New York,
N.H. & H.R.R.6 r
The question of whether a state court has power to enjoin a strike

in violation of the no-strike clause of a collective agreement has also
been raised. (Although the issue may have become largely academic,
under the Lincoln Mills decision, 66 which I shall discuss later, the question is really one of court power vs. board power, rather than state vs.
federal power, because that case held that federal law is applicable to
all actions for breach of a collective agreement. Since it seems clear,
however, that federal courts, because of the Norris-La Guardia Act,
cannot enjoin a strike in breach of a collective agreement, 7 I shall discuss
the question as one of the power of state courts, leaving until later the
problem raised by the case of McCaTrofl v. Council,6 8 as to whether
state courts in enforcing federal law can use the injunctive remedy
which the federal courts themselves cannot use.)
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently affirmed without
opinion a decision of the Pennsylvania court of common pleas which
held that the matter was not preempted. 9 In the McCarroll case, the
Supreme Court of California held that the strike which the lower court

61. City of Alcoa v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 308 S.W.2d
467 (Tenn. 1957).

62. NLRB v. Local 313, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 254 F.2d 221

(3d Cir. 1958).
63. County of Door v. Plumbers Union, AFL, 89 N.W.2d 920 (Wis. 1958).
64. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. National Marine Eng'rs Ass'n, 32 CCH Lab. Cas.
ff 70737 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1957).
65. 350 U.S. 155 (1956).

66. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
67. See Bull Steamship Co.. v. National Marine Eng'rs Ass'n, 250 F.2d 332 (2d
Cir. 1957).
68. 315 P.2d 322 (Cal. 1957).
69. Motor Transport Labor Relations, Inc. v. Local 470, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
40 L.R.R.M. 2567 (Pa. C.P. 1957), affd, 389 Pa. 638, 133 A.2d 836 (1957).
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had enjoined, although in breach of a collective agreement, was neither
an unfair labor practice nor a protected concerted activity and that
therefore the state court had power to enjoin. In the California case, the
court examined at length the nature of the strike before it, and found
that it was not a section 8 (d) "bargaining strike," that is, a strike called
for the purpose of modifying or terminating a collective agreement. The
court expressly refused to "decide whether a court has jurisdiction to
enjoin conduct that is in breach of a collective bargaining agreement and
at the same time may be reasonably deemed an unfair labor practice."7 0
The Pennsylvania court did not discuss whether or not the strike involved
in its case was a refusal to bargain under section 8(d). From the facts
set forth in the report of the case it would seem probable that it was.
Moreover it seems not impossible that the strike involved in the McCarroll case was also a "bargaining strike" under section 8(d).
There is considerable ground for arguing that under Garner principles, state courts may not enjoin strikes in breach of collective agreements:
(1) A strike in breach of a no-strike clause may be protected or
prohibited. For example, the strike involved in Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB 71 was a protected activity, whereas section 8(d) strikes are prohibited as a refusal to bargain.7 2 Under the Garner rule it would seem
to be within the Board's "duty of primary decision" to determine whether
such a strike is protected or prohibited.
(2) Not only would it appear that a determination, such as that
made by the California court, of whether a particular strike was or
was not covered by section 8(d), was a question peculiarly for the
Board,7 3 but other issues which are similarly Board issues may arise.
For example, in the Thayer case the Massachusetts court enjoined a
strike, holding that it violated the no-strike clause of a collective agreement, while the Board later held that the strike was a protected activity
because the collective agreement was made with a company dominated
74
union and was therefore illegal.

70. 315 P.2d at 328.
71. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
72. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957).
73. See, e.g., United Mine Workers, 117 NLRB 1095 (1957); Note, 58 CoLUm. L.
REv. 278, 281-82 (1958).
74. Thayer Co., 99 N.L.R3. 1122 (1952).
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With respect to other types of violations of collective agreements,
which would, of course, ordinarily be violations by the employer, there
is a somewhat different question. "The Board has long held ... that it
will not effectuate the policies of the Act for it to police collective agreements by attempting to resolve disputes over their meaning or administration.' '76 It is not entirely clear whether this is merely a matter of selfabnegation which, as in the Guss case, will not empower state agencies
to act, or whether it is founded on the indirect character of the Board's
remedies in such situations. (In Morton Salt, for example, the claim was
that the contract violation also violated section 8(a) (1) and (2) of the
act.) If the Board's position is justified by the inappropriateness of its
procedures, the states might have power to enjoin.
Of course the whole question of a state court's power to enjoin
violation of a collective agreement arises under the Lincoln Mills decision
which I shall discuss later. But it may be noted at this point that the
court in that case did not suggest that the jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board presented any obstacle to granting specific
enforcement of the arbitration clause of a collective agreement.
Up to the present the effect of preemption on the right of states
to limit by legislation the subject matter of collective bargaining has
not been widely explored. In order to illustrate what I have in mind let
me point out that it would be theoretically possible for a state so far
to limit what could be bargained about that there would be no content
to the federal right of collective bargaining. In fact state legislation does
limit collective bargaining in a number of ways. In New York a collective agreement, for example, in which the employer agreed to hire only
Negroes or Catholics or Italians, or to pay women less than he paid men
for the same work, would be unlawful, unless there is preemption. The
recent statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of age, raise a
question as to bargaining on the subject of compulsory retirement. The
Oregon supreme court has held that state legislation which would have
the effect of prohibiting contributory group insurance plans is "clearly
forbidden" by the National Labor Relations Act because such plans "are
mandatory subjects for collective bargaining inasmuch as section 8 (a) (5)
of the Labor Management Relations Act requires an employer to bargain
with a union concerning the matters set forth in section 9 (a) of the act."7 6
75. Morton Salt Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 175 (1958).
76. Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, Int'l Woodworkers, CIO, 203 Ore. 342,
358, 279 P.2d 508, 515 (1955).
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This problem is involved in a case in which certiorari has been
granted by the United States Supreme Court. The Ohio supreme court
affirmed, without opinion, a decision granting, at the instance of an
individual owner, an injunction against enforcement of a collective agreement which set minimum rates to be paid by transportation companies
to individual owners of trucks. This provision is standard in Teamster
Union contracts, and, of course, is intended to meet the old independent
contractor problem, the problem of protecting the jobs and rates of employees. The Ohio court held that the agreement violated the state's
anti-trust laws, that it constituted no unfair labor practice, and that it
was therefore enjoinable.7' In the Weber case, the Missouri supreme
court had held that the very activity which was enjoined constituted a
violation of Missouri's anti-trust laws. Yet the United States Supreme
Court found that Missouri was preempted because the activity was prohibited or protected by the federal act. Must state anti-trust laws also
yield to the federally protected right to bargain collectively?
When the Tennessee courts enjoined the refusal of employees of a
carrier to cross a picket line, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 7 1
The collective agreements under which these employees worked contained clauses permitting them to refuse to cross the picket lines. These
clauses were unlawful under the generally applicable common and
statute law of Tennessee.
Can states have the right to limit by legislation the subject matter
of collective bargaining and still not have the right through their courts
to inhibit labor activity, such as strikes and picketing, which is directed
toward forcing an employer to violate that legislation? In other words,
if the Supreme Court should uphold Ohio's right by its anti-trust legislation to limit the Teamsters' contract, would the Ohio courts be unable,
by reason of preemption, to prevent the Teamsters from striking and
picketing to force an employer to sign an agreement which the legislation
made unlawful? One would think that if the states could properly adopt
such legislation they ought to be able to prevent coercive action directed

77. Oliver v. A.C.E. Transportation Co., 42 L.RR.M. 2024 (Ohio App. 1957),
ajfd without opinion, 167 Ohio St. 299, 147 N.E.2d 856 (1958), cert. granted, 356 U.S.

966 (1958).
78. Teamsters Union v. Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 353 U.S. 968 (1957)
curiam, citing Weber).
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toward forcing an employer to violate it.1 9 But recent cases indicate
that this is not true of right-to-work laws. The states are expressly
permitted by the federal act itself to adopt such laws, yet the Supreme
Court has held that state courts cannot enjoin picketing for the purpose
of coercing an employer to violate such a state law.80 In Asphalt Paving,
Inc. v. Teamsters Union,"' the Supreme Court of Kansas expressed its
mystified acceptance of this result, and Mr. Justice Fatzer, in an able
opinion, pointed out at length the considerations which he believed should
have led the United States Supreme Court to the opposite result. He
concluded, however, that, as he said, "in the semi-darkness of [the] precedents, '' s2 he was forced to concur. Texas and North Carolina have
followed with similar bewilderment and reluctance.83 A Tennessee chancery court 8 4 has reached the other conclusion, but on the inadequate
basis of the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in a Tennessee case
involving the picketing of a barber shop.8 5
State courts may act, of course, in situations which do not affect
interstate commerce, and there are an increasing number of decisions
in which this issue is raised. As might be expected in dealing with this
unfamiliar concept, some lower courts have failed to distinguish between
"engaging in" commerce and "affecting" commerce.8 6
In the Asphalt Paving case to which I have already referred, the
Kansas supreme court presents an excellent analysis of the issue of
interstate commerce. In that case the union, in an attempt to organize
Asphalt, was picketing construction projects and general contractors.
Asphalt's activities were wholly intrastate but some of its equipment,
of the approximate value of $21,700, originated outside the state. Two
of the construction projects were for companies admittedly subject to
national jurisdiction. One of the general contractors purchased annually

79. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1297,
1326 (1954).
80. Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co.,
353 U.S. 969 (1957).
81. 181 Kan. 775, 317 P.2d 349 (1957).
82.

Id. at

-,

317 P.2d at 366.

83. Ex parte Twedell, 309 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. 1958); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Local
379, Int" Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL, 247 N.C. 620, 101 S.E.2d 800 (1958).
84. Pruitt v. Lambert, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 71265 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. 1957).
85. Flatt v. Barbers Union, 304 S.E.2d 329 (Tenn. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
904 (1957).
86. E.g., Lillys v. Segal, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. 171537 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958); Cortlandt
Co. Dep't Store v. Cohen, 205 Misc. 165, 127 N.Y.S.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
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$400,000 worth of materials originating outside the state, another $500,000,
another $300,000, and another $661,000. Two of them had respectively
$16,111 and $60,000 in direct out-of-state purchases. The court said:
...We specifically decline, in answer to the question presented, to decide this case on the basis, for example, that if any
one of the general contractors were engaged in interstate commerce it would follow that defendants' activities likewise affected
commerce, or that we could not so hold because the operations
of the ultimate victim, i.e., Asphalt Paving Company, were so
essentially local in character that they would preclude such a
finding.
By not looking solely to plaintiff's business operations nor
to those of any one of the general contractors against whom the
secondary pressure was applied, but rather, casting our regard
upon a combination of plaintiff's operations and the total business
of all the general contractors, there was substantial evidence
that defendants' unfair labor practices affected commerce. As
an integral part of this conclusion, however, we enter our caveat
that a reversal would not necessarily follow because a district
court found otherwise upon the same or similar facts, nor,
necessarily, would a case analogous in its outlines be controlled
by this conclusion as a matter of stare decisis. On the contrary,
we treat the matter of an interstate flow of commerce and the
existence of a burden upon it as one of fact, and review the
record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
findings, measured by decisions construing Taft-Hartley in that
respect.
Although the business of plaintiff was essentially local in
character, other businesses were necessarily affected, some of
which were conceded to be interstate in character, and we think
the totality of the situation should be considered in measuring
the commerce impact, both that which resulted from the secondary boycott and that which was likely to result, rather than to
view the activities of plaintiff and each general contractor
separately [citing cases]. Had the general contractors and owners
of construction projects refused to accede to defendants' demands, union employees who struck their employment would
not have returned to work and those who threatened to do so,
would have stopped work. Substantial construction work would
have immediately ceased which might well have resulted in a
decrease in the inflow of building materials and supplies from
out-of-state manufacturers to local retailers and thence to the
general contractors affected. The testimony concerning the dollar
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1958
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volume of business done by the general contractors and other
business concerns showed that the general contractors performed
construction services valued at several million dollars annually
and that they purchased materials and supplies amounting to
hundreds of thousands of dollars which indirectly crossed state
lines and, in addition, made direct purchases of over $76,000 in
interstate commerce. We think the record fairly presents that
a business such as plaintiff's although concededly local in character, cannot be considered as totally unconnected with interstate commerce, at least in a setting of a secondary boycott as
here presented. Furthermore, it is credible that defendants'
activities, if 'left unchecked,' would affect and burden interstate
commerce in the truest sense of the word.87
88
In Binder Constr. Co. v. Construction Laborers,
the Kansas court,
finding no evidence in the record of interstate commerce, although the
contractor involved had a government construction contract for an air
force base in the amount of approximately $330,000, held it "inconceivable" that a labor dispute involving local construction, without any
evidence that interstate commerce is affected, could be declared to affect
interstate commerce as a matter of law. The court said:

If the local character of a given construction project involving employers and employees engaged in the building trades
is construed as a matter of law to affect interstate commerce on
the ground that it is an integral part of a vast nation-wide construction industry, it would in effect wipe out the whole distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce. There would
be no limit upon the power of the Federal Government to
regulate the economy of the country in the most far-reaching
details.89
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has reached substantially
the same conclusion with respect to the construction of bank and an
office building. °0
And the Supreme Court of California has held that where a paint
company sold $178,910.10 annually in interstate and foreign commerce,
but the lower court made no specific finding as to the interstate com-

87. 181 Kan. at -,

317 P.2d at 358.

88. 181 Kan. 799, 317 P.2d 371 (1957).
89. Id. at -,

317 P.2d at 384.

90. Jones Constr. Co. v. Local 755, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL, 246 N.C.
481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957).
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merce aspect of its roofing business which was the activity directly involved, there was no preemption. 9'
On the other hand, a Michigan circuit court has held that "the
Supreme Court of the United States has spoken to the effect that generally labor controversies in [the construction] industry affect interstate
92
commerce.!
Failure to prove effect on interstate commerce has been held to be
fatal to a claim of preemption in cases involving a motion picture
theater, 93 and a small manufacturing company.9 4 In the case of a local
telephone answering service there have been decisions both ways. 95
That the employer involved filed charges with the National Labor
Relations Board, alleging effect upon interstate commerce, has been held
by Kansas to be sufficient to uphold a claim of preemption,96 and by
97
Ohio, to be insufficient.
California has held that the issue of interstate commerce cannot be
raised for the first time on appealY8 But the Wisconsin supreme court
holds that "the objection.., can be raised at any time, and by the court
on its own motion," since "in a situation like this, jurisdiction of the
subject matter is not conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel." 99
The Kansas supreme court has held that the purchase by a dairy
company of $100 a month in supplies from outside the state falls within
the de minimis rule. 0 0° (Incidentally, that was the case which was

91. Benton v. Painters Union, 45 Cal. 2d 677, 291 P.2d 13 (1955).
92. Pollington v. Aalsburg's Builders, 34 CCII Lab. Cas. 1 71295, at 96032 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1958).
93. Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical State Employees, 320 P2d
494 (Cal. 1958) (three judges dissenting).
94. Plattsburgh Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. Wright, 7 Misc. 2d 905, 164 N.Y.S.2d
934 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
95. Compare Elsis v. Evans, 321 P.2d 514 (Cal. App. 1958), with Silver, 21
N.Y.SL.R.B. No. 36 (1958).
96. Stieben v. The Constructive and General Laborers Union, 181 Kan. 832, 317
P.2d 436 (1957).
97. Faxon Hills Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 151 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio
1958). See also Dallas Gen. Drivers v. Wamix, Inc., 295 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. 1956).
98. Thorman v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 320 P.2d
494 (Cal. 1958).
99. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd. v. Lucas, 89 N.W.2d 300, 305 (Wis.
1958); accord, New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Budoff, 41 L.R.R.M. 2179
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
100. Newell v. Teamsters Union, 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817 (1957).
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01
recently reversed in a per curiam opinion in which ThornhilW
so
astonishingly came to life again.) Also held to be within the de minimis
rule are a bar purchasing annually $40,000 worth of liquor originating
outside the state,10 2 a local telephone answering service which proved
only 3 customers out of 360 billed outside the state and only 58 interstate
calls out of 13,000,103 and a contractor on residential construction who
purchased $233 from outside the state, where all the contractors on the
10 4
project together purchased $9,640 in such materials.

In the cases involving the following enterprises, injunctions have
been granted or state boards have taken action, without mention in the
opinions of preemption, presumably either because the point was not
raised or on the ground that interstate commerce was not substantially
affected:
Restaurants.0 5
Supermarket.'0 6
07
Motion picture theater.
Delicatessen.'0 "
Grocery store.109
Liquor store. 1 0
Moving company."'
112
Construction of packing plant.

101. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
102. Goldstein v. Bartenders Union, 40 L.R.R.M. 2706 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1957).
103. Silver, 21 N.Y.S.L.R.B. No. 36 (1958).
104. Caruso v. Madison Bldg. Trades Council, Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd. Dec. No. 4703 (1958).
105. E.g., Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957);
B & D Luncheonette v. Dallas, 8 Misc. 2d 457, 167 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Sup. Ct. 1957);
Emerald Inn, Inc. v. Cagiano, 41 L.R.R.M. 2237 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957); Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Bd. v. Rooney, 389 Pa. 587, 133 A.2d 533 (1957).
106. H & M Super Market v. Retail Clerks Union, 41 L.R.R.M. 2033 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1957).
107. North Eastern Theatres v. Motion Picture Operators Union, 41 L.R.R.M.
2037 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1957).
108. 32d St. Delicatetsen v. Culinary Workers, 41 L.R.R.M. 2093 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1957).
109. Brown v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union, 148 NE.2d 357 (Ohio C.P.
1956), af'd, 148 N.E.2d 360 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957), appeal dismissed, 167 Ohio St. 28,
145 N.E.2d 536 (1957); In the Matter of Employees of Radzievich Economy Markets,
Inc., 34 CCH Lab. Cas. II 71410 (Pa. C.P. 1957), aff d, 391 Pa. 618, 140 A.2d 162 (1958).
110. Homann v. O'Grady, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. if 71510 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
111. New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Westchester Movers, Inc., 34 CCH
Lab. Cas. if 71531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
112. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. O'Brien, 302 S.W.2d 60 (Tenn. 1957).
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Dry cleaner employing nine driver salesmen." 3
4
Funeral parlor."1
Plating business (17 employees)."i5
Wholesale hardware store and warehouse." 6
Wholesale smoked fish jobber (2 employees).117
Cafeteria."

8

Apartment house superintendent." 9 It has been held, however, that
where interstate commerce is affected, regulation of a one-man unit
20
is preempted.
Motel. 12 1
22
Stevedoring company.'
123
Manufacturer of wrought iron furniture.
24
Book publisher.
125
Manufacturer of gift ware.
The Kohler case established that state courts have not lost their
power to enjoin violent picketing, even where that picketing is an unfair
labor practice under the act. 126 Youngdahi v. Rainfair127 suggested the
possibility of extending the concept of violence somewhat to encompass
other types of undesirable activity on the picket line, with a warning,
however, to draw a careful line between such conduct and peaceful
picketing. In Newell v. Teamsters Union, 28 the Supreme Court of Kansas

113. General Teamsters Union v. Uptown Cleaners, 40 L.R.R.M. 2286 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1957).
114. Dalton v. Zebrowski, 169 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
115. Berger v. Livingston, 33 CCH Lab. Cas. II 71108 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
116. Van Dussen Co. v. Moyer, 5 Misc. 2d 1020, 165 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
117. Weiner v. Pruzan, 172 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
118. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Fortier, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 71340
(Pa. County Ct. 1958).
119. E.g., Clark v. Murphy 34 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 71390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958);
Galiano v. Siegal, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 71391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
120. International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 40 L.R.R.M. 2028 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1957).
121. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd. v. Hankin, 40 L.R.R.M. 2481 (Pa. C.P.

1957).
122.

Universal Terminal & Stevedoring Corp. v. Hurley, 9 Misc. 2d 192, 166

N.Y.S.2d 641 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
123. General Iron Corp. v. Livingston, 8 Misc. 2d 538, 170 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
124. McKibbin & Son v. Anastasia, 40 L.R.R.M. 2656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
125. Handcraft Mfg. Co. v. Livingston, 40 L.R.R.M. 2657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
126. UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
127. 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
128. 181 Kan. 898, 317 P.2d 817 (1957).
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sought to apply this doctrine to the pickets' taking pictures of people
crossing the picket line. The United States Supreme Court reversed, 120
not, it is true, on preemption grounds, but on the basis of the Thornhill
doctrine. However, there is no reason to believe that the content of the
violence concept is any different in free speech cases from what it is in
preemption cases.
A lower New York court has indicated a belief that state courts have
the power, under the improper conduct exception, to, enjoin the display
30
of untruthful signs on the picket line.'
Whatever the extent of the powers of the state courts, there is no
doubt, under the doctrine of the Richman case, 131 that they retain the
right to determine for themselves the question of preemption in the first
instance. This primary jurisdiction has been strengthened by a decision
of the court of appeals for the eighth circuit which held that the Board
itself cannot secire an injunction against action by a state court, except
in cases where the state court seeks to act in a case over which the Board
32
has taken jurisdiction.'
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Richman, the Board in
W. T. Carter and Brother133 resorted to another remedy which, though
no doubt much more time-consuming, reaches somewhat the same result
as would an injunction against state court action. In that case the Board
held that an employer's action in securing a state injunction was itself
an unfair labor practice, and he was ordered to obtain a vacation of
the injunction. It is interesting to note in this connection that, in at least
two recent situations, unions have tried a new angle in preemption, an
angle based on the Carter case doctrine. Faced with an application for
an injunction against certain of their activities, the unions claimed that
134
the act of applying for the injunction was itself an unfair labor practice.
In neither case were the unions successful, but the idea has possibilities.

129. Teamsters Union v. Newell, 356 U.S. 341 (1958).
130. Leathercraft Corp. v. Perry, 33 CCH Lab. Cas. U 71041 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
131. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co., 348 U.S. 511
(1955).
132. NLRB v. Swift & Co., 233 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1956).
133. 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950).
134. See N.L.R.B. Adm. Dec. of the Gen. Counsel, Case No. 587 (C.C.H. Nat'l Labor
Bd. Dec. U 13000) (1953); Republic Aviation Corp. v. Republic Lodge 1987, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists, 169 N.Y.S.2d 651 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
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The great break-through in state jurisdiction has come in the form
of further developments of the Laburnum rule. 135 In Automobile Workers
I 6
v. Russell
and Machinists Ass'n v. Gonzales,137 the Supreme Court,
in an action against a union, held that state courts have power to grant
compensation and punitive damages to an employee who is prevented
from working by reason of picketing activity or by reason of wrongful
expulsion from the union. In reaching this conclusion, the Court made
much, as it did in Laburnum, of the distinction between court action
which would prevent labor activity and action which is designed merely
to provide redress for damage done after the activity is concluded. This
overlooks, as the Chief Justice pointed out in his dissent, the restraining
effect which such damage suits are likely to have. Surely punitive
damages are designed, like criminal sanctions, to deter the conduct which
is punished.
Another point which both majority and minority appear to have
overlooked is the departure which these cases represent from what I
have called the most important principle of Garner. In both cases the
Court assumed the correctness of the lower court's finding of facts, as,
of course, it is bound to do by procedural rules. But the very point of
Garner is that the lower court was not to find any facts at all, because
the Board has the duty of finding these facts, "the duty of primary interpretation and application.' 138 If the Court, instead of assuming that
unfair labor practices had been committed, had assumed that the Board,
in the exercise of its "duty," would find on the facts that the activities
were protected by the national act, this assumption would have provided
a true test of the Garner rule. The question would then have been, not,
may a state give damages, including punitive damages, for an unfair
labor practice, but may a state punish unions for engaging in activities
which are protected by the act. By granting jurisdiction to state courts
to decide this question under local law, the Supreme Court cannot now
prevent a state court's penalizing by an award of damages any activity
found on the facts to be violative of state law. But, sooner or later, a
case will arise where the same conduct is handled by both the Board
and a state court and where the Board will hold the conduct which the

135.
136.
137.
138.

United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
356 U.S. 634 (1958).
356 U.S. 617 (1958).
346 U.S. at 489.
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state has penalized to be conduct which is protected by the National Act.
Mind you, I do not say that this is a bad result. I do say it is a major
departure from the Garnerrule.
The continuing nature of the relationship between employers and
their unions, to which the Chief Justice referred in his dissent in the
Russell case, renders the damage remedy in many instances unavailable
to employers as a practical possibility. But there are enormous practical
possibilities for policing union conduct in the threat of suits by employees,
especially where each of a large number may be held to be entitled, like
Russell, to $10,000, $9,500 of which was apparently punitive. In a companion case, 139 arising out of the same strike the verdict was for $450
in lost wages and $18,000 for mental anguish and as punitive damages.
The scope of the rule of the Russell and Gonzales cases remains to
be defined. In the case of Selles v. Local,14 0 for example, the state court
upheld recovery in the amount of $6,500-plus in a tort action based on
the wrongful action of the union in denying Selles a job as a reprisal for
organizing a meeting to complain about the method of election of union
officers. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari. 14 1 While the Gonzales
case was a case in contract based on wrongful expulsion, whereas Selles
was not expelled and his action sounds in tort, there seems to be no
good ground for believing that the Court would not affirm the Selles
case on the reasoning of Gonzales. (Incidentally, the parties conceded the
right of the state court to order the restoration of Gonzales' membership,
a position to which the Court gave its clear approval.)
In the Garmon case, 142 a companion case to Guss, in which preemption of the twilight zone was upheld, the Court expressly left open
the question of damages. The California court has now upheld, in a four
to three decision, an award of damages against a union for peaceful
14
recognitional picketing where the union did not represent employees.
An application for certiorari is pending. The situation in this case differs
from that in Laburnum, as Judge Traynor points out in a characteristi-

139. UAW v. Palmer, 31 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 70330 (Ala. 1956).
140. 50 Wash. 2d 660, 314 P.2d 456 (1957).
141. 356 U.S. 975 (1958).
142. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
143. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 320 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1958). Cf.
Tallman Co. v. Latal, 365 Mo. 552, 284 S.W.2d 547 (1955), where, however, the state
court held that there was sufficient violence and "harrassment" to justify a state
court injunction.
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cally able dissenting opinion, in that in Garmon there was no violence.
Moreover, the law applied to the case is not, in a sense, the generally
applicable common law of tort, but a common law rule especially applied
to this situation, and, in fact, applied for the first time, since the California court reversed its former rule on the lawfulness of the objective
of such picketing. These distinctions, particularly the second, might, it
seems, lead to a different result in the Supreme Court. An affirmance
might be considered to lend encouragement to states to devise all sorts
of new rules, statutory as well as common law, for policing union (and,
possibly, employer) conduct.
It seems likely that a lower Connecticut court was wrong in deciding
recently that preemption prevented it from entertaining a suit for tort
damages against a union on the ground of inadequate represeiitation in
grievance procedure.14 4 Though another question may arise here, that
of whether the duty to represent does not arise under federal law, there
is no reason to believe that a state court would not have concurrent
jurisdiction.
May employees or unions, under the doctrine of the Russell and
Gonzales cases, sue employers for damages for conduct which is also
a violation of the national act? It seems obvious that here, as usual, what
is sauce for the goose can also be used by the gander, and that where
there is a basis for state action in local contract or tort law, the fact
that the conduct complained of is also an unfair labor practice need not
be held to prevent the state's giving a damage remedy. Cases like
Swope v. Emerson 45 would appear to this extent to be overruled. However, for much of the employer conduct prescribed by the act there are
probably no state remedies, since the basic employee rights were created
by the act itself. Here the question may arise, as perhaps it does in the
Garmon case, as to whether a state, so minded, might properly create a
new remedy in damages based upon rights under the act.
I have time only to say a very few words about another kind of
preemption, the preemption of the state law of collective agreements
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act and the
Lincoln Mills decision. 146 Although this case, too, has created many'
144. Savva v. Royal Industrial Union, 20 Conn. Supp. 438, 138 A.2d 799 (Super.
Ct. 1958), following McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 89 A.2d 566 (1952).
145. 303 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957).
146. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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problems, its impact has just begun to be felt in the state courts, which,
for the most part, are continuing to enforce collective agreements with
no thought, or, at least, no mention of federal law. And yet I understand
Lincoln Mills to hold that in all suits for violation of collective agreements between employers and labor organizations representing employees
in industries affecting commerce, federal law applies. State courts, of
course, have concurrent jurisdiction, as they do on all federal questions
from which they are not expressly excluded, but state courts must apply
federal law. The Supreme Court of California has so held.1 47 Certiorari
was denied.' 48 The Supreme Court of Kansas and an appellate division
in New York have upheld the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, but
appear to believe that state law applies.' 49 A lower court in New York
has so held.150
Many questions are opened up and left unsolved by Lincoln Mills,
in addition to the very fundamental question of what is the federal law,
which, according to the opinion in Lincoln Mills, remains to be "fashioned" by the federal courts. For example, the McCarroll case held that
state courts are governed by federal substantive law, but may provide
the usual remedies available in state courts, including an injunction
against breach of contract, even if that remedy is not available in the
federal courts because of the Norris-La Guardia Act. This problem, interesting as it is, may prove to be academic, since it is clear that defendants threatened with such injunctions can remove their cases to the
federal courts.
Under section 301 only labor organizations can sue, not individuals,
and under the Westinghouse decision,' 5 ' if that is still law, labor organizations cannot sue to vindicate individual rights. This opens up the possibility that in an action by an individual or by a labor organization vindicating individual rights, a state court may apply state law to the construction
of a collective agreement, while the same court, or a federal court, in

147. McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 315 P.2d 322
(Cal. 1957).
148. 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
149. Coleman Co. v. UAW, 181 Kan. 969, 317 P.2d 831 (1957); Anchor Motor
Freight Corp. v. Local 445, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 71361 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2d Dep't 1958).
150. In re Steinberg, 40 L.R.R.M. 2619 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957).
151. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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an action by the labor organization in its own right, will apply federal
law to the construction of the same agreement.
These are only a few of the many problems opened up by Lincoln
Mills. As I have said, the state courts, and presumably the parties, seem
not yet to have fully realized what has hit them. But it will not be long
before employers and unions will be made to understand, for example,
that arbitration clauses in collective agreements are now specifically
enforceable in every court in the land, and that there is, for another
example, a rapidly developing federal law on arbitrability which will
govern the decisions of all our courts on that issue.
As for the future, it is only possible to say that there may be whole
additional areas of preemption that have not yet been developed. I
remember back in 1947, when I told an editor of the New York Times
that the Taft-Hartley Act, via the then as yet almost wholly unplumbed
possibilities of preemption, might in fact prove to be labor's Magna Carta
by inhibiting issuance of state court injunctions and thus providing a
freedom from effective restraint more extensive than labor had ever
hitherto enjoyed in this or any other country, he told me politely but
firmly that I was an eccentric who misunderstood the purpose of the act,
which was to impose, not remove, restrictions on labor. I suggest now
that, in addition to what I have already said about the almost endless
possibilities involved in the concept of limiting the subject matter of
collective bargaining, there is a good chance that certain aspects of regulation of internal union affairs may be preempted by already existing
legislation. (For example, can states provide that convicted crooks shall
not serve as union officials or that unions shall have periodic elections?
Doesn't this interfere with free choice of bargaining representatives?)152
And the Kennedy proposals will surely preempt a lot more. (For example, can a state provide for annual elections if the federal statute prescribes quadrennial?) A lower Pennsylvania court may have been presaging the preemption of all welfare fund matters, including reform
statutes like those in New York, Connecticut, Washington and several
other states, when it decided recently that it had no jurisdiction to instruct a welfare fund trustee on his power to purchase real estate because
that jurisdiction was preempted by Taft-Hartley.' 53 And again in this
field with additional legislation there will be additional preemption.
152.
153.

See. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
In re Bricklayers Union, 34 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 71301 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
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And what, if anything, is to be done about it? It seems unlikely that
anything at all will be done in the near future. Senator Kennedy's
proposed bill omits even the Administration proposal for returning to
the states jurisdiction over those cases in which the Board declines to
exercise jurisdiction. If anything is done about no-man's land, it seems
to me that it is much more likely to be done either by the Supreme
Court in enlarging the Board's field of activity by limiting its discretionary power to refuse jurisdiction, first in the hotel case which is now
before the Court, 54 and later, perhaps, with respect to the jurisdictional
rules generally, or by Congress, as in the Kennedy Bill, or in increasing
the appropriation for the Board, as the Board has requested, so that it
can take more cases.
And now what should be done? For reasons which I cannot now
develop in detail, but which include the difficulties of the courts in
administering the present rules, and their reluctance to do so, the lack
of sound economic or sociological justification for these rules, the inefficiencies of administration in which they result, and the disregard they
entail for the basic values of federalism, I believe that a change is demanded. And I still believe in the proposal which I made several years
ago' 5 5 for a basic study of the problems and an allocation of power to
regulate the various aspects of labor-management relations in accordance
with considerations of relevant economic and sociological policies and
of efficient administration, and with great emphasis on the values inherent in our federal system. This would mean the assumption by Congress of responsibility for the effective operation of federalism. As Professor Cox has pointed out, 5 6 Congress has always left the matter of
adjustment of the federal system to the Court, and is notably reluctant
to undertake responsibility for it. But, unlike Professor Cox, who believed shortly after Garner that a few more decisions would largely clear
the whole matter up, I believe that the problem is too complex for case
by case solution and I can find little that is genuinely illuminating in
the "elucidating litigation" and much that seems quite unacceptable in
the practical results.

154. Hotel Employees Union v. Leedom, 249 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert.
granted, 355 U.S. 951 (1958).
155. See Hays, Federalism and Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA.
L. REV. 959 (1954).
156. Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1297, 1326
(1954).
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